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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Rey Ornelas appeals from the Judgment of Conviction. Mr. Ornelas asserts that
the district court committed reversible error when it denied his Batson challenge and
refused to remove three jurors for cause. Mr. Ornelas seeks a new trial.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The State charged Mr. Ornelas by Indictment with six counts of lewd conduct,
two counts of sexual abuse of a child under sixteen, and two counts of sexual battery of
a minor child sixteen or seventeen years of age. (R., pp.23-28.) The State alleged that
Mr. Ornelas committed ten felonies involving five different minor females.
28.) After several pretrial motions, the case proceeded to a jury trial.

(R., pp.23-

See generally

Trial Transcript Volume I.) After a witness testified about an alleged criminal act never
disclosed by the State, the district court granted Mr. Ornelas' motion for mistrial.
(TrVol.l, p.387, L.17 -p.388, L.2.)

The second trial began in December 2011.

(See

generally Trial Transcript Volume II.) 1
The district court began the voir dire process inquiring of the veniremen.
(Tr., p.7, L.5-p.64, L.14.)

The district court identified some potential biased jurors,

however, it did not remove any for cause proving an opportunity for counsel to explore
further.

(Tr., pA7, Ls.9-12, p.52, Ls.2-19.)

After the district court concluded its

questioning, it gave the State the opportunity to inquire. (Tr., p.64, L.22-p.122, L.25.)
The State did not move to strike any individual for cause. (Tr., p.64, L.22-p.122, L.25.)

1 The issues in this case involve the second trial and, therefore, any citation to Volume II
will simply be Tr. and any citation to Volume I will be TrVo1.1.
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During Mr. Ornelas' inquiry, several potential jurors disclosed bias and the district
court removed some of them for cause. (R., pp.161-167.) Three objected-to potential
jurors were not removed for cause: Juror 13(167), Juror 32 (78), and Juror 34 (684f
(R., pp.161-166.) Mr. Ornelas pass the jury for cause, except for the three that should

have been removed by the district court.

(Tr., p.227, Ls.4-S.)

Jurors 32(78) and

34(684) were struck during the selection process; however, Juror 13(167) became a
member of the petit jury. (R., p.166.)
The parties selected ten males and four females. (Tr., p.232, Ls.7-24.) Although
the State only struck males from the jury, the prosecutor made a Batson challenge
against the defense. (Tr., p.230, Ls.21-23, p.228, Ls.11-14.) Mr. Ornelas had removed
eleven females and one male. (Tr., p.228, Ls.11-14.) The State removed six males
and waived six challenges. (Tr., p.230, LS.17 -23.) The State accused Mr. Ornelas of
removing women from the panel.

(Tr., p.228, LS.17 -23.)

Mr. Ornelas explained his

reasoning for dismissing the potential jurors. (Tr., p.229, Ls.3-p.230, L.12.) In stating
its position that Mr. Ornelas had violated Batson, the State argued,
I can indicate to the court that my tenth preempt was done in an effort to
try to get a female on the panel because every - pretty much every female
[sic] in front of him was males as a result of the defense's striking. And I
just think the whole purpose of Batson is to get a fair and impartial jury
that is reflective of the community, and that there are no challenges, no
gender specific reasons or Fourteenth Amendment specific reasons for
the strikes.
(Tr., p.231, Ls.17-2S.)

2 There was some confusion with the juror numbers; however, the court minutes reflect
both the juror's initially assigned number and apparently the juror's seat number. (Tr.II,
p.66, L.23-p.67, L.13, p.70, Ls.3-2S, p.115, Ls.7-9.) The juror numbers are the ones
reflected by the court reporter minutes. (R., pp.161-165.)

2

The court found that the defense explained its reasoning for challenging the
jurors it did and that it could not conclude that there was purposeful discrimination.
(Tr., p.233, Ls.2-11.)

The district court denied the State's Batson's challenge.

(Tr., p.233, Ls.8-12.)
Thereafter, Mr. Ornelas made a Batson challenge against the State. (Tr., p.233,
Ls.13-14.)

Mr. Ornelas pointed out that all of the State's exercised peremptory

challenges were against males. (Tr., p.233, Ls.14-18.) Moreover, the State admitted
on the record that the last peremptory challenge was made with the intent to obtain
another female on the panel. (Tr., p.231, Ls.17-21, p. 233, Ls.15-18, p.234, Ls.12-19.)
The prosecutor provided additional rational to support striking Juror Number 24.
(Tr., p.234, Ls.12-19.) The district court felt satisfied with the composition of the jury
and

determined that the State's peremptory challenge was note made in a

discriminatory manner. (Tr., p.235, Ls.14-22.)
The jury acquitted Mr. Ornelas of three of the charges: sexual battery of P.Z.,
sexual battery of O.z., and lewd conduct with M.G.. (R., pp.248, 251,254, 267.) The
jury convicted Mr. Ornelas of the remaining charges: four counts of lewd conduct and
three counts of sexual abuse of a child under sixteen. (R., pp.246, 247,249, 250, 252,
253, 255, 267.)

The district court sentenced Mr. Ornelas to a unified sentence of

twenty-five years, with ten years fixed, on each of the lewd count convictions, and a
unified sentence of fifteen years, with ten years fixed, on each of the sexual abuse of a
child under sixteen years convictions. (R., pp.279-281.) Mr. Ornelas timely appealed.
(R., pp.284-287.)

3

ISSUES
1)

Did the state violate Mr. Ornelas' and Juror Number 24's rights to equal
protection when it used its peremptory challenges to only strike men from the jury
and deliberately removed Juror Number 24 because he was male?

2)

Did the district court abuse its discretion and deny Mr. Ornelas his Fifth, Sixth
and Fourteenth Amendment rights under the United States Constitution and his
Article 1, Sections 7 and 13 rights under the Idaho Constitution to a trial before a
fair and impartial jury when it refused to excuse biased jurors for cause?

4

ARGUMENT
I.

The State Violated Mr. Ornelas' And Juror Number 24's Rights To Equal Protection
When It Used Its Peremptory Challenges To Only Strike Men From The Jury And
Deliberately Removed Juror Number 24 Because He Was Male
A.

Introduction
In arguing that Mr. Ornelas violated Batson the prosecutor admitted that she

used her tenth peremptory on a male because she wanted to get another female on the
jury. The prosecutor used all six of her peremptory challenges to remove males from
the jury.

After the court denied the prosecutor's challenge against Mr. Ornelas, a

Batson challenge was alleged against the prosecutor because of her candid disclosure
to the court for utilizing gender as a reason to remove a juror from panel. Mr. Ornelas
asserts that the district court erred in overruling his Batson challenge and as such both
Mr. Ornelas and Juror Number 24's rights under the Equal Protection Clause were
violated. Therefore, Mr. Ornelas seeks a new trial.

B.

Standard Of Review
The determination of whether peremptory challenges have been exercised in a

discriminatory manner presents a mixed issue of law and fact. It is ultimately a claim
grounded in constitutional principles over which the appellate court exercises free
review. See State v. HoI/and, 135 Idaho 159, 161 (2000); State v. Hansen, 127 Idaho
675, 678 (Ct. App. 1995).

However, when assessing the district's court's findings

regarding the State's explanations for its peremptory challenges on appeal, the district
court's findings will only be overturned if they are clearly erroneous in light of the facts
as a whole. State v. Araiza, 124 Idaho 82, 87 (1993).
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C.

The State Violated Mr. Ornelas' And Juror Number 24's Rights To Equal
Protection When It Used Its Peremptory Challenges To Remove The Juror
Because He Was Male
After the peremptory challenges were exercised by all parties, but before the jury

was impaneled and sworn, the prosecutor made a motion pursuant to Batson.
(Tr., p.228, Ls.11-14.)

Mr. Ornelas explained why he struck several of the potential

jurors. (Tr., p.229, L.3-p.230, L.8.) In discussing the matter, the court noted that the
defense did strike eleven females and one male. (Tr., p.230, L.24-p.231, L.1.) Counsel
had to go off the record to determine the gender of the jurors struck. (Tr., p.231, LS.26.) Counsel confirmed he struck eleven females and one male. (Tr., p.231, Ls.7-10.)
In providing further argument, the prosecutor stated:
I can indicate to the court that my tenth preempt was done in an effort to
try to get a female on the panel because every - pretty much every female
[sic] in front of him was males as a result of the defense's striking. And I
just think the whole purpose of Batson is to get a fair and impartial jury
that is reflective of the community, and that there are no challenges, no
gender specific reasons or Fourteenth Amendment specific reasons for
the strikes.
(Tr., p.231, Ls.17-25.)

After determining the gender of the panel, the district court

denied the State's motion. (Tr., p.232, L.23-p.233, L.12.) The court stated:
The defense has indicated that the reasons or grounds for
elimination or his use of peremptory challenges has been largely on a
female that is a counselor and has counseled other victims of sexual
abuse, and some of the other females have indicated prior sexual abuse.
Although it is eleven to one, I guess it's not all twelve that he
exercised female [sic] against. I can't find for the record that there's been
purposeful discrimination, and I'm going to deny the Batson challenge.
(Tr., p.233, Ls.2-12.)
Thereafter, Mr. Ornelas made a Batson challenge against the prosecutor based
upon the information the prosecutor revealed to the court. (Tr., p.233, Ls.13-18.) All of

6

the prosecutor's peremptories were against males and the prosecutor openly admitted
that gender was the reason she used the tenth challenge. (Tr., p.233, Ls.13-18.)
Apparently, the court asked the prosecutor if she wanted to start the jury process
over since both of the parties were making a Batson challenge, to which the prosecutor
responded in the negative.

(Tr., p.233, Ls.19-22.)

After hearing the prosecutor's

explanations, it denied Mr. Ornelas' Batson challenge.

(Tr., p.235, Ls.14-22.)

Mr. Ornelas submits that the court erred in denying his Batson challenge.
In Batson v. Kentucky, the United States Supreme Court established a three-step
inquiry to determine if peremptory challenges have been exercised in a discriminatory
manner. 476 U.S. 79, 93-94 (1986). See also Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162, 168
(2005); State v. Araiza, 124 Idaho 82, 87 (1993); State v. Owen, 129 Idaho 920, 932
(Ct. App.1997). Next, if the defendant has established a prima facia case, the burden
shifts to the State to adequately explain the exclusion by offering a race or genderneutral justification for its strikes. Batson, 476 U.S. at 94; JE.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S.
127, 141 (1994); Araiza, 124 Idaho at 87, 856. The explanation provided must be a
clear and reasonably specific explanation of legitimate reasons for exercising the
challenges and not merely pretextual. Batson, 476 U.S. at 97-98; JE.B., 511 U.S. at
145; State v. Erickson, 148 Idaho 679 (Ct. App. 2010).

Lastly, if a race or gender-

neutral reason is offered for the challenge, the district court must then determine
whether that explanation overcomes the inference of discrimination established by the
defendant's prima facia showing. Batson, 476 U.S. at 97; Araiza, 124 Idaho at 87.
Although Batson initially only applied to racial discrimination, in JE.B. v.
Alabama, the United States Supreme Court extended Batson to cases of gender
discrimination as well, noting, "[d]iscrimination in jury selection, whether based on race
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or on gender, causes harm to the litigants, the community and the individual jurors who
are wrongfully excluded from participation in the judicial process."

511 U.S. at 140.

Furthermore, in Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991), the United States Supreme Court
found that the juror's right to equal protection is also at issue when the State uses their
peremptory challenges in a discriminatory manner, and, even though it is the juror's
right to equal protection, the defendant still has standing to assert the equal protection
claim of an excluded juror. Powers, 499 U.S. 400 (1991).
In J.E.B., the State used all but one of its peremptory challenges to strike only
men from the jury.

J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 129. The Court explained that "[w]hen state

actors exercise peremptory challenges in reliance on gender stereotypes, they ratify
and reinforce prejudicial views of the relative abilities of men and women." Id. at 140.
Such discrimination creates the potential for cynicism, particularly in cases such as
rape, sexual harassment, and paternity, where gender-related issues are prominent. Id.
This can create the impression that the judicial system has acquiesced to keeping one
gender from fully participating or that the '''deck has been stacked' in favor of one side."

Id.
In State v. Erickson, the district court denied a Batson challenge because it
believed that the jury empanelled was gender-balanced. Erickson, 148 Idaho at 687.
The Erickson Court recognized that the right to nondiscriminatory jury selection applies
to both sexes. Id. Moreover, the question is whether the State engaged in purposeful
discrimination, not whether the result is a balanced jury panel. Id. The Erickson Court
instructed the lower court that upon remand if a similar situation arose the district court
would be required to determine whether the reason given was legitimate or merely
pretextual. Id. at 688.
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In the instant case, the district court found, based on the record before it, that the
State did not purposefully discriminate based on gender. (Tr., p.235, Ls.14-17.) The
court denied the Batson challenge. Mr. Ornelas asserts that the court erred.

1

Mr. Ornelas Made A Prima Facia Showing That "The Totality Of The
Relevant Facts Gives Rise To An Inference Of Discriminatory Purpose"

Mr. Ornelas presented a prima facie showing of purposeful discrimination by the
prosecutor. See Batson, 476 U.S. 79. The prosecutor struck only males from the jury.
(Tr., p.230, Ls.21-23.) Additionally, the prosecutor told the court that it used gender to
strike Juror Number 24. (Tr., p.231, Ls.17-25.) The prosecutor stated, "I can indicate to
the court that my tenth preempt was done in an effort to try to get a female on the panel
because every - pretty much every female [sic] in front of him was [sic] males as a
result of the defense's striking." (Tr., p.231, Ls.17-21.) Thus, the defense satisfied the
first part of the inquiry, by demonstrating a prima facia case of gender discrimination
based on the State's using all six of its challenges on men and the rational given for
excusing Juror Number 24.

2.

The State Failed To Provide Gender-Neutral Reason Explanation

The State was required to give a clear and reasonably specific gender-neutral
explanation for its "legitimate reasons" for the exercise of each its challenges, not
merely provide a credible, gender-neutral reason for "the method" used in exercising its
challenges as the State asserts. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 98 n.20. (1986);

see also Miller-EI v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 239 (2005) (quoting Batson's language that
"the prosecutor must give a clear and reasonably specific explanation of his legitimate
reasons for exercising the challeng[e]."). In Batson, the Court specifically stated that the
State's burden cannot be met by general assertions that its officials did not discriminate,
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or deny a discriminatory motive, or argue good faith in making each selection. Id. at 94,
98. The Court also noted that "a neutral explanation related to the particular case to be
tried" must be articulated. Id. at 98.
Furthermore, in Mi/ler-EI v. Dretke, the United States Supreme Court emphasized
that the reasons of the State do not stand on their own, but are viewed in context,
stating the defense can "rely on 'all relevant circumstances' to raise an inference of
purposeful discrimination."

Id. at 241.

In Miller-EI, the Court looked at the reasons

given for excluding certain black jurors and similar responses given by white jurors in
determining that the peremptory challenges were being exercised in a discriminatory
fashion. See id. generally. The Court noted that "[i]f a prosecutor's proffered reason for
striking a black panelist applies just as well to an otherwise-similar nonblack who is
permitted to serve, that is evidence tending to prove purposeful discrimination to be
considered at Batson's third step." Id. at 241.
In providing its gender-neutral explanation for Juror Number 24, the prosecutor
stated:
The state challenged Juror No. 24, part of the reason was because we
were trying to get another female on, but part of the reason was also
because he is young. The State had concerns with regards to his life
experiences. The state also had concerns because he has a small child,
but not necessarily a child of the age of the victims, so the state had
concerns with regards to him relating.
(Tr., p.234, Ls.12-19 (emphasis added).)

Prior to giving her explanation about Juror

Number 24, the State explained why it had removed Juror Number 6. (Tr., p.234, LsA7.) The State removed that juror in part because he was not married and did not have
children.

(Tr., p.234, LsA-7.) Additionally, the State explained that it removed Juror

Number 1 because he also did not have children. (Tr., p.234, L.25-p.235, L.3.)
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The rationale offered by the State clearly indicates it had gender in mind when it
was at least making some of the peremptory challenges. (Tr., p.231, Ls.17-25, p.234,
Ls.12-19.)

The State brought the gender bias issue to the court's attention when it

admitted that it removed Juror Number 24 because he was male. (Tr., p.231, Ls.17-25.)
The State admitted that it exercised its preempts in the manner it did to avoid having an
all male panel. (Tr., p.231, Ls.17-25.) As noble as it seems to try to make sure the jury
represents a cross-section of the community, if a prosecutor exercises his challenges
based upon a juror's gender or race he is violating the jurors' right to equal protection.
See J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 140.

3.

The District Court Erred When It Found That The State Did Not Use Its
Peremptory Challenges In A Discriminatory Manner To Exclude Juror
Number 24 and Only Men From The Jury

The third focus of the inquiry turns to the district court weighing the evidence
already presented by both sides. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 98. The Supreme Court has
noted that "even if the State produces only a frivolous or utterly nonsensical justification
for its strike" the analysis proceeds to step three, where the court must determine "the
persuasiveness of the defendant's constitutional claim." Johnson v. California, 545 U.S.
162, 168, 171 (2005).

The district court's finding that the State did not use its

peremptory challenges in a discriminatory manner is clearly erroneous. See State v.
Araiza, 124 Idaho 82,87 (1993).

The district court's analysis demonstrates that it was focused on an improper
consideration when determining whether the Batson challenge should have been
granted against the State. (Tr., p.235, Ls.14-22.) The district court felt satisfied that the
final makeup of the jury had SUbstantial female influence and, therefore, felt that it
should proceed with this jury. (Tr., p.235, Ls.18-22.) The United State's Supreme Court
11

noted in J.E.B. that each juror has a right to be free from discrimination because of their
gender. 511 U.S. at 140. The right exists regardless of the results of the panel and
regardless of whether it is only white men being challenged.

See generally, id.; see

a/so, State v. Erickson, 148 Idaho 679,688 (Ct. App. 2010).
The State offered a gender specific reason for removal of Juror Number 24. The
State removed Juror Number 24 because he was male. When the State was called on
its discriminatory practice, it gave an honest answer and again admitted that the juror
was removed in part because of their gender. The prosecutor also gave a pretextual
answer in an attempt to disguise their discriminatory practice by saying the juror was
young and a dad. Other male jurors were removed because they were not dads. While
the non-gender based answers may have been sufficient had the prosecutor not already
admitted twice that the juror was removed because of their sex, the gender based
rational cannot be overlooked. 3 Juror Number 24 was removed because of his gender
and, therefore, the district court made a clearly erroneous finding that the State did not
engage in purposeful gender discrimination.

Not only was every single peremptory

exercised by the State against men, the State admitted twice to having gender-biased
reasoning for removing Juror Number 24, violating Mr. Ornelas' and the juror's right to
equal protection.

Assuming for a moment that the issue raised by the defendant addressed a racial
discriminatory practice as opposed to gender discrimination, no court would allow a
prosecutor's explanation that a peremptory strike was used in part because of the
juror's race, along with the rational of age. Once admitted that race was a basis for the
removal, a Batson challenge would be successful.
3
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II.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion And Denied Mr. Ornelas His Fifth, Sixth And
Fourteenth Amendment Rights Under The United States Constitution And His Article 1,
Sections 7 And 13 Rights Under The Idaho Constitution To A Trial Before A Fair And
Impartial Jury When It Refused To Excuse Biased Jurors For Cause

A.

Introduction
The district court abused its discretion when it refused to excuse three biased

jurors for cause, thereby requiring Mr. Ornelas to use two of his peremptory strikes to
remove two for-cause jurors.
jurors.

Juror 13(167) ultimately became one of Mr. Ornelas'

Mr. Ornelas submits that the court denied him his constitutional rights to an

impartial jury.

Additionally, it deprived him of due process of the law because he

received less peremptory challenges than the State by having to utilize his to cure the
district court's errors.

B.

Standard Of Review.
It is for the trial court to use its discretion when determining whether a juror can

render a fair and impartial verdict.

State v. Luke, 134 Idaho 294, 298 (2000).

For

reversal on appeal, the defendant must show an abuse of discretion by the trial court.
Id.
When an exercise of discretion is reviewed on appeal, the appellate court
conducts a multi-tiered inquiry. The sequence of the inquiry is (1) whether
the lower court rightly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether
the court acted within the outer boundaries of such discretion and
consistently with any legal standards applicable to specific choices; and
(3) whether the court reached its decision by an exercise of reason.
State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600 (1989).
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C.

After Utilizing All Of His Peremptory Challenges, Including Having To Use Two
Of His Challenges In Order To Remove Two Biased Jurors, Mr. Ornelas Was
Forced To Have An Incompetent Jury And, Therefore, His Constitutional Rights
To An Impartial Jury Were Violated
In criminal cases in Idaho, a defendant's right to a fair trial, in front of impartial

jurors, is protected by both the United States Constitution and the Idaho Constitution.
These rights are embedded in the United States Constitution's Fifth Amendment right to
due process of law, the Sixth Amendment right to trial in front of an impartial jury, and
the Fourteenth Amendment right to due process of law. U.S. Canst. amend. V, VI, XIV.
Additionally, the Idaho Constitution recognizes the right to a jury trial through
Article I, § 7 and the right to due process through Article I, § 13. Art. I, §§ 7, 13. These
constitutional rights are further embedded in Idaho Code §§ 19-1902, 19-2019, and 192020,4 and Idaho Criminal Rule 24(b),5

which includes the right to peremptory

challenges.

1.

Juror Number 34(684) Was Not Impartial And, Therefore, Should Have
Been Excused By The District Court For Cause

Juror 34(684) informed the court that their mind would be made up as soon as
they heard "some" evidence. (Tr., p.216, Ls.6-10.) The juror indicated that at that given
moment he did not know whether the Mr. Ornelas was innocent or guilty; however, the
State would not have to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. (Tr., p.217, Ls.1-3.)
The juror admitted that the court's instructions would be disregarded. (Tr., p.217, Ls.46.) Mr. Ornelas challenged the juror for cause. (Tr., p.217, Ls.12-13.)

4 Section 19-1902 provides a statutory right to a jury in criminal cases, and sections 192019 and -2020 provided that jurors should be stricken for cause if they are determined
to bring with them actual or implied bias.
5 Rule 24(b) provides the procedure for making "for cause" challenges.
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The State attempted to educate the juror about court instructions and the jury
system. (Tr., p.217, L.17-p.219.) The juror still revealed that they would make up their
mind regardless of the court's instructions. (Tr., p.219, Ls.1-2.) Then asked if the juror
would consider the court's instructions, the juror indicated they would consider them,
however, would not be held to them. (Tr., p.219, Ls.6-S.) The State submitted the issue
to the court. (Tr., p.219, Ls.14-15.)
The court then interjected and told the juror that the instructions would not tell the
jury how to make up their minds. (Tr., p.219, Ls.16-19.) When asked, "in your own
mind are you telling the court that, well, I'm not going to require the state to prove it
beyond a reasonable doubt in my own mind.

I'm going to require less", the juror

responded, "I'm saying if my gut instinct tells me one way or the other that's probably
how I'm going to vote or whatever." (Tr., p.220, Ls.12-14.) In further explanation of the
juror's willingness to complete elements that the State fails to prove, the juror utilized
the State's bacon, lettuce, and tomato sandwich (BLT) example. The juror stated, "If it's
missing a slice of bacon, and I think that bacon is there, it's a BL T." (Tr., p.220, LS.1S21.)
The district court concluded, "what I understand you to say, sir, is I want to hear
the evidence.

And once I hear the evidence, I'm going to make my own decision."

(Tr., p.220, Ls.22-25.)

The juror agreed.

(Tr., p.221, L.1.)

The court denied

Mr. Ornelas' request to remove the juror. (Tr., p.220, Ls.22-23.)

a.

The District Court Did Not Act Consistently With The Legal
Standards Applicable To Actual Juror Bias And, Therefore, It Did
Not Act Within The Outer Boundaries Of Its Discretion

The fundamental rights to a fair trial and to a jury trial encompass the right to
jurors

that

will

conscientiously

follow
15

the

district

court's

instructions.

A "'crucial assumption underlying that system [of trial by jury] is that juries will follow the
instructions given them by the trial judge.'" Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 324, n.9
(1985) (quoting Parker v. Randolph, 442 U.S. 62, 73 (1979) (opinion of Rehnquist, J.)).
If this assumption did not underlie the jury trial system, "it would be pointless for a trial
court to instruct a jury, and even more pointless for an appellate court to reverse a
criminal conviction because the jury was improperly instructed." Id.
In addition, a fair trial is understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of
confidence. See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434 (1995). Notably, "'the concept of
a fair trial encompasses a decision by a tribunal that has understood and applied the
law to all material issues in the case.'"
TRAYNOR,

Franklin, 471 U.S. at 324, n.9 (quoting R.

The Riddle of Harmless Error, 73-74 (1970)).

In State v. Ellington, the Idaho Supreme Court recognized that
[T]he Constitution presupposes that a jury selected from a fair cross
section of the community is impartial, regardless of the mix of individual
viewpoints actually represented on the jury, so long as the jurors can
conscientiously and properly carry out their sworn duty to apply the law to
the facts of the particular case.
151 Idaho 53, 69 (2011 )(quoting Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 86 (1988)
(quoting Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 184 (1986)).
Juror 34(684) candidly admitted to his bias that he would not follow the court's
instructions.

He would make up his mind after hearing some of the evidence, not

necessarily all of it. He would judge the defendant's guilt or innocence based upon his
gut feelings and not the jury instructions. This juror had no qualms with the prosecutor
not introducing evidence of all of the elements to make Mr. Ornelas guilty of the crimes
charged.

If this juror felt that Mr. Ornelas was guilty he was going to cast his vote

accordingly. This juror should have been removed for cause.
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b.

The District Court Did Not Reach Its Decision By An Exercise Of
Reason

Even if this Court determines there is an insufficient record to determine that the
district court applied the wrong legal analysis and, therefore, acted outside the
boundaries of its discretion, it should nevertheless determine that the district court
abused its discretion.

Given the facts of this case, the district court's denial of

Mr. Ornelas' motion to exclude Juror Number 34(684) was simply not supported by
reason As discussed above, the standard to be applied in cases such as this one was
whether Juror No. 34(684) could be an impartial juror. As is also discussed above, the
record is completely devoid of any evidence that he could be impartial and, in fact, is
filled with evidence indicating that the opposite was true.

Juror Number 34(684)

admitted that he would not require the State to meet its burden, would fill in missing
elements of the crime if he felt the defendant was guilty, and would only consider the
courts instructions, not necessarily follow them. (Tr., p.216, L.3-p.221, L.4.) This record
demonstrates Juror Number 34(684)'s clear bias, i.e., his unfitness to sit as a juror in
this case. Accordingly, the district court's failure to grant Mr. Ornelas' motion to exclude
Juror Number 34(684) for cause was an abuse of discretion.

2.

Juror Number 32(78) Was Not Impartial And, Therefore, Should Have
Been Excused By The District Court For Cause

During Mr. Ornelas' inquiry of Juror 32(78), it was discovered that the multiple
count indictment caused this juror to doubt Mr. Ornelas' presumption of innocence.
(Tr., p.209, L.20-p.210, L.1.) Juror 32(78) expressed difficulty holding the State to its
burden of proof.

(Tr., p.210, Ls.14-21.)

Utilizing the State's example of a bacon,

lettuce, and tomato sandwich (BLT), the juror stated that even if the State was required
to prove the existence of the sandwich but forgot the bread, the juror would still make a
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finding of the BL T. (Tr., p.210, Ls.14-21.) This juror revealed that if they felt the person
was guilty and the State proved most of its case, they would feel more compelled to
returning a guilty verdict even though the State did not prove the entirety of it.
(Tr., p.210, Ls.14-21.) The juror confirmed that they would have difficulty returning a not
guilty verdict following an instruction that required proof of all elements of the offense if
the juror felt the most of the elements were present, but not all. (Tr., p.210, L.22-p.211,
L.6.) Mr. Ornelas challenged the juror for cause. (Tr., p.211, Ls.4-S.)
The State inquired. (Tr., p.211, L.6.) When specifically asked by the prosecutor,
if the State failed to do its job and prove each of the elements, would the juror return a
not guilty verdict, even if the juror felt the defendant was guilty, to which the juror
responded, they would not be able to hold the State to its burden. (Tr .. p.211, L.16p.212. L.3.) When the prosecutor asked the follow up, "Even if the court tell you this is
what must be proven, and the state doesn't prove it all?" the juror responded, "It's kind
of back to what I said earlier. I think someone else would be better at that. I can't tell
you yes or no because I'm not in this situation, but I might have a hard time with that."
(Tr., p.209, Ls.7-10.) In an attempt to rehabilitate the juror, the prosecutor asked, "what
we're looking for is just making sure that we want jurors who can follow the court's
instructions, and if the state doesn't do their job, who can find the defendant not guilty.
Can you do that?" The juror responded,
I don't know if I can. Just because - like I said, if I feel the state - if he
really is guilty, and the state didn't do their job, then as a juror - I would
have a hard time saying the state didn't do their job, but I know he's guilty.
Does that make sense?
(Tr., p.213, Ls.1-5.) The prosecutor ended their inquiry and submitted the issue to the
court. (Tr., p.213, Ls.6-7.)
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The court then inquired. (Tr., p.213, L.8.) The court told the juror that he heard
the juror say that they could not believe ten people would lie about the allegations.
(Tr., p.213, Ls.10-12.) The juror explained they were not sure it was ten people or not
but was just concerned about the counts and they made an assumption there might be
more than one child. (Tr., p.213, Ls.13-16.) The judge pointed out that the juror was
making an assumption prior to hearing any evidence. (Tr., p.213, Ls.17-22.) The court
then asked the juror to promise to not make any assumptions about the case and to
listen to the evidence that is presented at the trial. (Tr., p.213, L.24-p.214, L.2.) The
juror stated, "I would do my best. Like I said, I will try to be fair and impartial. Because
if he's not guilty, I wouldn't want to send him to prison for that." (Tr., p.214, Ls.3-6.)
The judge then asked the juror if they could follow the instructions, to which, the juror
responded they could. (Tr., p.214, Ls.19-22.) Thereafter, the court denied the motion
to remove the juror for cause. (Tr., p.215, Ls.3-4.)

a.

The District Court Did Not Act Consistently With The Legal
Standards Applicable To Actual Juror Bias And, Therefore, It Did
Not Act Within The Outer Boundaries Of Its Discretion

Section" C1 a is incorporated herein by reference. Juror 32(78) indicated that it
would reduce the State's burden of proof because they were willing to fill in missing
elements if the State failed to introduce the evidence if the juror felt the defendant was
guilty. The juror candidly admitted bias and the district court erroneously denied the
motion for removal for cause.

b.

The District Court Did Not Reach Its Decision By An Exercise Of
Reason

Even if this Court determines there is an insufficient record to determine that the
district court applied the wrong legal analysis and, therefore, acted outside the
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boundaries of its discretion, it should nevertheless determine that the district court
abused its discretion.

Given the facts of this case, the district court's denial of

Mr. Ornelas' motion to exclude Juror Number 32(78) was simply not supported by
reason. As discussed above, the standard to be applied in cases such as this one was
whether Juror No. 32(78) could be an impartial juror. As is also discussed above, the
record is completely devoid of any evidence that they could be impartial and, in fact, is
filled with evidence indicating that the opposite was true. Juror Number 32(78) admitted
that would not require the State to meet its burden, would fulfill missing elements of the
crime, if he felt the defendant was guilty, and would only consider the courts
instructions, not necessarily follow them.

(Tr., p.209, L.20-p.213, L.5.)

This record

demonstrates Juror Number 32(78)'s clear bias, i.e., unfitness to sit as a juror in this
case. Accordingly, the district court's failure to grant Mr. Ornelas' motion to exclude
Juror Number 32(78) for cause was an abuse of discretion.

3.

The District Court's Failure To Excuse Juror Nos. 34(684) And 32(78)
Warrants Vacation Of Mr. Ornelas' Conviction

"Idaho . . . has no statutory law requiring a defendant to use a peremptory
challenge to remove a juror who should have been removed for cause in order to
preserve an objection to the failure to dismiss that juror for cause." State v. Ramos, 119
Idaho 568,574 (1991). "[A]n error in refusing to grant a challenge for cause "is grounds
for reversal only if the defendant exhausts all peremptory challenges and an
incompetent juror is forced upon him." Nightengale v. Timmel, 151 Idaho 347 (2011);
see also State v. Hauser, 143 Idaho 603, 609-11 (Ct. App. 2006) (reversal appropriate
when district court should have removed the juror and the juror sits on the petit jury).
The requirement that a defendant must use all of his peremptory challenges to preserve
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the issue for appeal is not objectionable. However, the requirement that the defendant
rolls the die and leave the biased juror on the petit jury in hopes of creating reversible
error or waste one of his peremptory challenges to cure the district court's erroneously
ruling is nonsensical.

a.

This Court Should Hold That Prejudice Is Presumed When The
District Court Erroneously Denies The Defendant's Motion To
Remove A Juror For Cause If The Defendant Utilized All Of His
Peremptory Challenges

The requirement that either a defendant leave the biased jury on the panel or
waste one of his peremptory challenges should not be the requirement in Idaho to cure
the district court's erroneous decision to not remove the juror for cause.

See,

Nightengale v. Timmel, 151 Idaho 347 (2011). Leaving the bias juror on the panel gives
the defendant the best chance of reversal on appeal. It creates a reversible error issue
for appeal if the district court should have removed the juror. Worst-case scenario the
juror was not biased and the defendant still received his constitutional right to an
impartial jury.

This Court has issued several recent opinions chastising defense

counsel for "sandbagging" an issue before the district court in an attempt to gain a
reversal on appeal. See State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 224 (2010); State v. Longest,
149 Idaho 782 (2010); see also State v. Stocks, 153 Idaho 171 (Ct. App. 2012); State v.
Norion, 151 Idaho 176 (Ct. App. 2011). The remedy created by the appellate courts to
correct erroneous decision by district court judges encourages practitioners to sandbag
this issue and not mitigate the problem.

Therefore, Mr. Ornelas seeks to have this

Court hold that when the district court errs in failing to remove a biased juror when
counsel makes a motion for removal for cause, and uses his peremptory challenge to
correct the district court's erroneous ruling, the district court's erroneous decision would
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not require proof of a remaining partial jury. As recognized by our Court of Appeals, "If
the trial court resolves any doubt on the side of disqualification, '[t]he worse the court
will have done in most cases is to have replaced one impartial juror with another
impartial juror[.]''' State v. Hauser, 143 Idaho at 610 (quoting Justus v. Commonwealth,
220 Va. 971, 266 S.E.2d 87, 90 (1980)).
Thus, in this case because the district court failed to correctly remove for cause
Jurors Number 34(684) and 32(78), Mr. Ornelas should be granted a new trial. This
Court should hold that he need not demonstrate that a partial jury was left after removal
of the two biased jurors.

b.

The District Court's Erroneous Decision To Not Remove Juror
34(684) For Cause Was Not Harmless Because A Partial Juror
Was Forced Upon Him

Assuming, arguendo, the Court continues with the status of the law in that the
defendant must demonstrate that he exercised all of his peremptory challenges and an
incompetent juror was forced upon him, Mr. Ornelas meets that burden. When passing
the jury for cause, Mr. Ornelas continued his objection to the three jurors that the court
did not remove for cause. (Tr., p.227, Ls.4-5.) Additionally, Mr. Ornelas utilized all of
his peremptory challenges. (Tr., p.231, Ls.13-16.)
During voir dire examination, Juror 13 revealed their internal struggle to be fair on
this type of case. (Tr., p.165, L.15-p.170, L.8.) In response to the defense's inquiry,
Juror 13(167) stated:

I think I would struggle with not erring on the side of the child being a
parent of daughters, and also I work with children. I think it would be
difficult for me. I think if I had a doubt I would probably err on the side of
the child versus the defendant because of how I feel regarding children.
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(Tr., p.16S, Ls.1S-20.) In response to a follow up question, the juror indicated it would
be difficult to follow the court's instructions given their predisposition; however, it would
try. (Tr., p.16S, L.23-p.166, L.4.) The juror indicated that this would be a difficult case
to listen to and under a different set of circumstances, the juror felt that they could be
fair. (Tr., p.166, Ls.8-19.) During continued questions to decipher the juror's ability to
be impartial, the juror stated that "I think it would be difficult [to be a fair juror in this
case]." (Tr., p.167, Ls.2-S.) Again, the juror expressed concern that they would not be
able to be fair and stated that if they felt there was doubt, they would err on the side of
the child.

(Tr., p.167, L.16-p.168, L.3.)

When asked the following question, "So

everything - the law takes the position that everything is subject to some doubt. But
you have to get to that position of giving the defendant the benefit of the doubt and the
State proving beyond a reasonable doubt.

Do you think you can do that?" the juror

responded, "I think it would be very difficult for me to do that." (Tr., p.168, Ls.11-17.)
After inquiry, Mr. Ornelas moved to remove Juror 13 for cause. (Tr., p.168, Ls.23-24.)
The State inquired further. (Tr., p.169, L.1-p.170, L.8.) The prosecutor informed
the juror that the court would provide instructions to help understand reasonable doubt.
(Tr., p.169, Ls.3-11.)

When asked if the jury could find Mr. Ornelas not guilty if

reasonable doubt existed, the juror stated, "I think so. It just would depend on - how to
define reasonable doubt and how much doubt - you know, it's hard to know."
(Tr., p.169, Ls.12-14.) When the prosecutor explained that the district court would give
an instruction on reasonable doubt, the juror thought that would be helpful. (Tr., p.169,
Ls.18-23.) Then when asked if the court provided a reasonable doubt instruction and
reasonable doubt existed could the juror return a not guilty verdict, the juror responded
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"I think so." (Tr., p.169, L.24-p.170, L.3.) The district court denied Mr. Ornelas' request
to remove the juror for cause. (Tr., p.170, Ls.4-7.)
Idaho law recognizes that a juror may have either an actual or an implied bias
which would impair his ability to be impartial. 6 (I.C. §§ 19-2019 (providing that jurors
should be excused for cause for implied or actual bias), -2020 (enumerating the
grounds for a challenge for implied bias).) "Actual bias is 'bias in fact'-the existence of
a state of mind that leads to an inference that the person will not act with entire
impartiality." U.S. v. Gonzalez, 214 F.3d 1109, 1112 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting United
States v. Torres, 128 F.3d 38, 43 (2d Cir. 1997)). In contrast, implied bias is a bias that

is presumed as a matter of law.

Id.

It comes about in those situations where the

"average person in the position of the juror in controversy would be prejudiced." Id.
(quoting Torres, 128 F.3d at 45, as the original source). In Idaho, there are a limited
number of situations in which bias will be implied as a matter of law, and those
situations are specifically identified in the Idaho Code. See I.C. § 19-2020.
In the present case, Mr. Ornelas contends that Juror No. 13(167) was biased as
a matter of fact. The fact that Juror No. 13(167) candidly admitted that they would tend
to believe the State's witnesses over the defendant, despite the evidence, makes it
clear that there is no way that the district court have reasonably determined that he
could "act with entire impartiality." I.C. § 19-2019. This is so despite the deferential
standard of review that is required to be applied in this case. This juror, however, did
indicate that they once properly instructed they might be able to follow the court's

See Gonzalez, 214 F.3d at 1111-14, for an excellent discussion of the nature of each
type of bias.

6
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instructions.?

However, the court essentially told all jurors that they did not have to

follow the court's instructions when it refused to remove Juror Number 34(684).
(Tr., p.219, L 16-p.220, L.4.)
While inquiring of Juror Number 34(684), the court stated:
I can tell you with certainty I am not going to instruct you on how to make
up your mind .... I'm also going to instruct you as to what it means to
have a case proven beyond a reasonable doubt. And in your own mind
you are telling the court that, well, I'm not going to require the state to
prove it beyond a reasonable doubt in my own mind. I'm going to require
less.
(Tr .. p.219, Ls.16-19.) Juror Number 34(684) responded:
I'm saying if my gut instinct tells me one way or the other that's probably
how I'm going to vote or whatever. . .. [B]ack to the sandwich, the BLT.
I'm probably another one of those. If it's missing a slice of bacon, and I
think that bacon is there, it's a BLT.
(Tr., p.220, Ls.12-21.) Therefore, any rehabilitation gained on this juror was destroyed
by the district court's discussions with another biased juror. The result was a juror that
would favor the State's witnesses, believe the credibility of the children, and lower the
State's burden of proof. Mr. Ornelas was deprived of his right to trial before a fair and
impartial jury.

c.

Alternatively. Mr. Ornelas Was Deprived Of Due Process Of Law
Because He Was Required To Cure The District Court's Erroneous
Decision To Not Remove Two Jurors For Cause By Utilizing His
Peremptory Challenges

While it is true that states are not required to provide peremptory challenges to
protect a defendant's federal constitutional right to a fair and impartial jury, once a state
chooses to do so, the procedures employed must comport with the demands of the Due

? Mr. Ornelas recognizes that because this juror indicated that it could follow the court's
instructions, the juror may have been rehabilitated and, therefore, counsel is not raising
the issue that the biased juror sat on the jury like the facts established in Hauser.
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Process Clause. Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 39. (1985). "When States provide
peremptory challenges (as all do in some form), they confer a benefit beyond the
minimum requirements of fair [jury] selection, and thus retain discretion to design and
implement their own systems[.]" Rivera v. I/Iinois, 556 U.S. 148, 157-58 (2010) (internal
quotations & citations omitted).
Peremptory challenges are a means of achieving an impartial jury and are "one
of the most important of the rights secured to the accused." Ross v. Oklahoma, 487
U.S. 81, 89 (1988). Ross is based on Oklahoma law that requires the defendant to use
peremptory challenges to cure a district court's erroneous refusal to excuse jurors for
cause. Id. at 89-90. Idaho has no such requirement. Peremptory challenges serve to
"eliminate extremes of partiality on both sides" and "to assure parties that the jurors
before whom they try the case will decide on the basis of the evidence placed before
them and not otherwise." Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219 (1965), overruled on

other grounds by Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
The value of peremptory challenges is that they are intended and can be
used when defense counsel cannot surmount the standard for a cause
challenge. Requiring the defendant to show actual bias-the standard
applicable to cause challenges-for the forced expenditure of a peremptory
challenge renders the separate statutory grant of peremptory challenges
totally meaningless. Such a construction also renders superfluous that
aspect of section 913.03 which sets forth juror impartiality as grounds for a
cause challenge, as the same showing would be required to vindicate the
statutory right to exercise a peremptory challenge after a trial court has
erroneously caused the loss of a peremptory challenge. Finally, the
interpretation endorsed by the dissent would amplify the ability of one
party to use peremptory challenges at the expense of the other in
contravention of the plain language of section 913.08, which grants each
party to a criminal proceeding the same number of peremptory challenges.
Cf People v. LeFebre, 5 P.3d 295, 304 (Colo.2000) (holding that state law
requiring both sides to receive the same number of peremptories unless
good cause is shown rendered the wrongful grant of a prosecutorial cause
challenge a violation of the defendant's due process rights). Such
interpretations directly undercut this Court's charge of interpreting statutes
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as a harmonious whole, giving effect to each of their constituent parts.
See Acosta v. Richter, 671 SO.2d 149, 153-54 (Fla.1996).
While the deleterious consequences of the interpretation espoused by the
dissent may not be readily apparent in a case involving one curative use
of a peremptory strike, it comes into stark relief when one considers what
might occur if the trial court were to wrongly, but not purposefully or
intentionally, deny two or more cause challenges. In such instance, the
defendant would be in the position of expending many, if not all, of the
peremptories allotted to correct the trial court's errors, and consequently
would be deprived of the entitlement to challenge those jurors whose voir
dire answers reveal a real potential for bias, but who would otherwise not
be subject to a challenge for cause. See Johnson v. State, 43 S.W.3d 1, 6
(Tex.Crim.App.2001) ("If one of an accused's peremptory challenges could
be taken away from him, why not five be taken, and if five, why not ten,
leaving none, and all jurors be acceptable save unfair and partial ones.")
(quoting Wolfe v. State, 147 Tex.Crim. 62, 178 S.W.2d 274, 279-80
(1944)). Under such a scenario, a defendant would lose the ability to
exercise peremptories as a separate and distinct class of challenges as
provided under Florida law. Nothing in the jurisprudence of this Court,
including our decisions requiring a defendant to expend curative
peremptory challenges, supports such a result.

Busby v. State, 894 So. 2d 88, 100 (Fla. 2004).
This court has held that when a defendant alleges the district court erred in failing
to remove a juror for cause and that juror remains seated on the petit jury, the
defendant must have exercised all of their peremptory challenges in order to preserve
the issue for appellate review. State v. Fondren, 24 Idaho 663 (1913); see also State v.

McMahon, 37 Idaho 737 (1923) (no grounds for reversal of judgment where defendant
exercised only three of his six peremptory challenges, "leaving the only inference to be
drawn that the jury was entirely satisfactory"); State v. Van Vlack, 57 Idaho 316
(1937)(defendant's allegation on appeal that voir dire showed jurors were prejudiced
against him not reviewed where defendant did not request change of venue and used
only six of his ten peremptory challenges, informing the court "we are satisfied with the
jury.") (overruled on other grounds by State v. White, 93 Idaho 153 (1969)); but see

State v. Ramos, 119 Idaho 568,569-70 (1991) (defendant's failure to show in motion for
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new trial that he was prejudiced by having to use peremptory to remove juror who
should have been removed for cause, or show that any of the other jurors on the panel
were not impartial or were biased, rendered error harmless).
In Mr. Ornelas' case, each party was entitled to twelve (12) peremptory
challenges, with fourteen (14) jurors being seated, two (2) of whom would be alternates.
(Tr., p.230, Ls.13-15, p.232, Ls.3-6.)

The manner and order in which peremptory

challenges were exercised was not made part of the record by either the judge, the
clerk of the court, or the court reporter. Who would be designated an alternate juror
was not determined until the conclusion of the case, when the clerk drew two names at
random, identifying Juror 234 and Juror 134 as alternates. (Tr., p.769, L.16-p.770, L.8.)
These procedures were in accord with applicable Idaho Criminal Rules and statutory
provisions. (lCR 24(c),(d)(1); I.C. § 19-2016; I.C. § 19-2030).
Mr. Ornelas should not be punished for using his peremptory challenges to try to
remedy the district court's erroneous denial of his two for-cause challenges, and thereby
reducing the additional prejudice and partiality that would have resulted by allowing
Juror 34(684) and Juror 32(78) to be impaneled. It would create a strange result indeed
if Mr. Ornelas had rolled the dice and left the challenged jurors on the panel, they had
deliberated and returned a guilty verdict, and on appeal this Court granted him a new
trial because two biased jurors took part in deliberations. Yet he is entitled to no relief
because he tried to mitigate the damage up front by using his peremptories in an effort
to fix the court's mistakes. Such a result cannot be justified, particularly where it renders
the statutory right to peremptory challenges nugatory.
Mr. Ornelas was deprived of his right to trial before a fair and impartial jury;
instead, he received a trial before a partial jury shaped by the State, tilted to its favor
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and advantage. See People v. LeFebre, 5 P.3d 295, 304 (Colo.2000) (holding state law
requiring both sides to receive the same number of peremptories unless good cause is
shown rendered the wrongful grant of a prosecutorial cause challenge a violation of the
defendant's due process rights); Shane v. Commonwealth, 243 S.W.3d 336, 339-40
(Ky.2008) (holding "[w]hen a defendant is forced to use a peremptory strike on a juror
who has not been properly excused for cause, the court has actually taken away from
the number of peremptories given to the defendant by rule of this Court[,J" and that
failure

violates

a

substantial

right

that

can

never

be

deemed

harmless);

Commonwealth v. Auguste, 305 N.E.2d 819, 823-24 (Mass. 1992) (reversible error
when right to fair trial is violated by trial court's erroneous denial of for cause challenge
requiring defendant to exhaust his peremptory challenges); State v. Good, 43 P.3d 948,
960 (Mont. 2002) (structural error for a trial court to deny a for cause challenge and
defendant exhausts his peremptory challenges); Randle v. AI/en, 862 P.2d 1329, 1334
(Utah 1993) (recognizing that allowing one side additional peremptories gives that party
the unfair "opportunity to shape the jury to its advantage" and applying a presumption of
prejudice when one side is granted too many peremptories); State v. Santelli, 621 A.2d
222, 224-25 (Vt. 1992) (rejecting argument that a defendant must show actual prejudice
based on court's erroneous denial of a for cause challenge to get a new trial, because
the court's errors "would become unreviewable because the focus of the appellate
inquiry would not be on the court's error but on the qualifications of the juror subject to
the lost peremptory challenge.").
Under these circumstances, the court's failure to excuse jurors for cause
deprived Mr. Ornelas of his right to twelve peremptory challenges and resulted in the
impaneling of a jury predisposed to believing the State's witnesses.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Ornelas respectfully requests this Court vacate the Judgment of Conviction
and remand the matter for a new trial.
DATED this 2th day of February, 2013.

DIANE M. WALKER
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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